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Abstract. Privacy in Home Automation Systems is a topic of increasing
importance, as the number of installed systems constantly grows. In this
paper we investigate the ability of an outside observer to link sets of
message timestamps together to predict user presence and absence. The
question we try to answer is: If attacker Eve has captured 1 hour of traffic
from victim Alice’s HAS and knows whether Alice was present at that
time, can Eve deduce Alice’s state by capturing another hour of traffic?
We apply different statistical tests and show that in certain situations,
the attacker can infer the user’s presence state with absolute confidence.
Keywords: Traffic Analysis · Home Automation · Statistical Analysis · Privacy
1 Introduction
Home Automation Systems (HASs) are rapidly gaining popularity. They can
be used to control lights, window blinds, heating etc. Wireless HASs are cur-
rently most popular for use in private homes, as the installation is easier than
for their wired counterparts. However, previous research has shown privacy risks
of wireless HASs [17]: A passive eavesdropper can derive information about user
habits from message contents and metadata. Message encryption—the obvious
countermeasure—does not prevent analysis of communication patterns: packets
sent by a remote control to a door lock reveal that a user is locking or unlocking
a door. Even if addresses are obfuscated, message intervals could reveal informa-
tion, e.g. about absence or presence of users interacting with the HAS. In this
paper, we study the extent of information leakage through message intervals in
HASs. Our contribution consists of two parts: We present a new attack vector
which passive adversaries can use to infer information about the presence of users
from the timings of messages alone. Additionally, we analyse the success rates
of this approach and determine conditions under which a high confidence can
be achieved. While we acknowledge that certain situations are not distinguish-
able by software using our model (e.g. a user being asleep and not interacting
with the system vs. a user being absent), the goal is to find out whether or not
situations exist in which a correct statement can be reliably achieved.
The paper is structured as follows: In Sec. 2 we give an overview of existing
research in similar areas. Sec. 3 contains the definition of our system model as
well as our model of the attacker. In Sec. 4 we summarise the attack method
whose effectivity we are investigating. Sec. 5 contains the description of our
analysis procedure and is followed by its results in Sec. 6. We conclude the
paper and provide an outlook on future work in Sec. 7.
2 Related Work
Several authors have pointed out the privacy risks of HASs. Jacobsson et al.
provide an overview of security and privacy risks in HASs [8]. A survey by
Denning et al. states “activity pattern privacy” with the sub-goals of “presence
privacy” (which we investigate in the paper at hand) and protection of occupant
identities as HAS security goals [5]. Privacy implications of specific systems have
been studied by Mundt et al., who derived information about user habits from
the communication of office building automation systems [14], and were able
to eavesdrop on communication of a wired bus system from a distance of 5 cm
[13]. In our own previous work, we have demonstrated the extent of information
leakage from a wireless HAS that neither encrypts communication nor attempts
to obfuscate sender and receiver addresses [17]. Moreover, we have studied legal
aspects of HASs that use data processing in the cloud [16]. Packet inter-arrival
times as a side channel have been considered by Wendzel et al. [19], but their
work focuses on establishing covert channels. Our contribution instead addresses
the problem of deducing information from existing timings.
As wireless HASs are a specific type of wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
some general results about WSNs might apply. There is a considerable body of
literature on privacy in WSNs. In their survey [10], Li et al. distinguish between
data privacy (concerning both the queries and the sensed data) and context
privacy, with the latter term referring to both location privacy and temporal
privacy. A number of publications consider traffic analysis in WSNs as a means
to breach location privacy [4][11][20], but this aspect is not very relevant in HASs.
While temporal privacy (which concerns the ability of an attacker to determine
the timing of an event detected by the WSN) is related to the problem we
investigate, we do not consider individual events in the paper at hand.
The use of traffic analysis (i.e. analysis of traffic patterns without consider-
ation of communication contents) is not restricted to particular networks; the
distribution of message inter-arrival times is commonly considered in traffic ana-
lysis. For example, Moore and Zuev [12] use that distribution (among other dis-
criminators) to classify internet traffic; Bissias et al. [2] use inter-arrival times
to identify web sites in encrypted, proxied HTTP traffic. Cˇeleda et al. [18] use
traffic analysis in Building Automation Networks to detect attacks.
3 System and Attacker Model
For our analysis we assume the following situation. A user Alice has installed a
home automation system. The system generates messages based on automation
rules and in reaction to user behaviour. Both the rules and Alice’s habits are
known only to Alice. As the idea of this paper is to analyse if certain information
can be deduced from message timings alone, it makes sense to exclude all other
possible sources of information an attacker might be able to use. Real-world
observations as well as publicly known statistics (e.g. “The average user is asleep
during the night and at work from 09:00 to 17:00.”) are explicitly neglected here.
The network topology of our model is a fully connected graph with respect to
intended communication. This means that any two devices which are intended
to communicate with each other can do so directly. This model is used in many
available products; only few systems employ multi-hop communication. However,
the research presented in this paper can be used as a base for developing dummy
traffic schemes in both types of systems.
The communication is fully encrypted and packets are padded to a fixed
length. Both message payloads and message headers (including source and des-
tination addresses) are hidden from an outside observer.
In certain situations, low-level channel information can be used to try and
fingerprint devices when both sender and receiver are static [1][3][6]. For the
analysis at hand, we disregard this possible source of information. We argue that
these kinds of attacks require a level of effort and dedication from the attacker
which is unrealistic for common houses or when mounting traffic analysis attacks
on a large scale against many buildings at once. Furthermore, countermeasures
against these attacks have been explored in literature. We thus assume that the
attacker cannot determine the source of a packet by these means.
We model our attacker—Eve—as a global passive adversary. Eve can de-
tect any communication happening within the network, i.e. she can capture any
packet being transmitted. However, Eve cannot break the packet encryption and
she cannot distinguish between different devices by other means such as trian-
gulation or wireless device fingerprinting.
Eve’s goal is to determine whether or not Alice is at home at a given time.
For this, we assume she has the following a priori information about Alice’s
home automation system:
1. Eve knows that Alice’s HAS does not generate dummy traffic.
2. Eve has captured all communication packets during one hour of HAS oper-
ation. She also knows whether Alice was at home during this time.
The reason why we choose an interval of one hour for item 2 is twofold. On the
one hand, a time frame of more than one hour allows Eve to mount sophisticated
device fingerprinting attacks [6], invalidating our assumptions. However, it also
makes decisions less useful: The longer the time frame, the less likely Alice is to
keep this state during the next minutes or hours. On the other hand, a shorter
time frame makes decisions harder, as there is less data to base an assumption
on. We performed the same experiments with time frames of half an hour and
two hours, getting nearly the same results: The difference in the AUC values in
Sec. 6.3 was 0.005 on average with a maximum of 0.104.
Using the available information, Eve needs to decide at a given time whether
Alice is currently at home or not. Eve can capture the communication packets
again for the same time frame to try and deduce Alice’s presence state.
4 Attack Methodology
Our analysis works as follows: We assume the role of the attacker, Eve. Using
the captured communication packets from two different time frames of one hour
each, we try to find similarities in the statistical distribution of timestamps
or inter-message intervals. We apply three different statistical tests to the two
samples: The Kolmogorow-Smirnow Two-Sample Test [9], the Chi-Square Test
of Independence [15] and the “Message Counts Test”.
The statistical tests used here tackle the null hypothesis that the two sam-
ples have the same underlying distribution function. Instead of rejecting the null
hypothesis with a certain confidence at a threshold depending on the desired
confidence, we analyse the computed test statistics and try to determine suit-
able thresholds ourselves. The reason behind this is twofold: On the one hand,
we do not have any a priori knowledge about the underlying distribution func-
tions. On the other hand, we want to determine whether the difference in the
distributions between two samples with different user states is high enough to
allow a distinction based on the calculated test statistics. If this is the case, we
can subsequently calculate thresholds and resulting confidence values for HASs.
4.1 Kolmogorow-Smirnow Test (KS Test)
The Kolmogorow-Smirnow Test for homogeneity [9] is based on the empirical
cumulative distribution functions of the two input samples. Informally speaking,
it measures the maximum vertical distance between the two curves. Formally,
given to samples X = [x1, x2, . . . , xn] and Y = [y1, y2, . . . , ym] with respective
empirical cumulative distribution functions FX and FY , it computes the value
D = sup
a
|FX(a)− FY (a)| (1)
If the result D is high, the null hypothesis is rejected.
We use the SciPy3 implementation of the KS 2-sample test from SciPy ver-
sion 0.14.0 and apply it to the inter-message time intervals. In addition to the
KS statistic D (sometimes referred to as dmax or Da,b in literature), the imple-
mentation computes a p-value as a function of D and the sample sizes. This
accounts for the fact that large samples with the same underlying distribution
are expected to show less differences than smaller samples (as per the law of
large numbers). We examine both the value of D as well as the p-value.
3 http://www.scipy.org, accessed 2015-12-18
Sample A: 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8
Sample B: 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Fig. 1. Example of the approach used for binning using a minimum bin size of 5. The
bounds are chosen so that at least 5 elements of each sample fall into one bin.
4.2 Chi-Square Test (χ2 Test)
Pearson’s Chi-Square Test [15] follows a similar approach as the KS test, but
calculates the sum of squared differences between the actually measured frequen-
cies and the expected ones. In the 2-sample form, the expected frequencies are
estimated by taking the average frequencies of the two samples. Formally, the
test expects categories and respective frequencies as inputs. Given two samples
and m categories, these frequencies can be written as X = [x1, x2, . . . xm] and
Y = [y1, y2, . . . , ym], where xi is the number of elements in the first sample which
fall into the i-th category. Using the intermediate definitions
n = nx + ny =
m∑
i=1
xi +
m∑
i=1
yi (2)
∀z ∈ {x, y} : Ez,i = nz × (xi + yi)
n
(3)
the test statistic is then defined as
χ2 =
n∑
i=1
(xi − Ex,i)2
(Ex,i)
+
n∑
i=1
(yi − Ey,i)2
Ey,i
(4)
If the value of χ2 is high, the null hypothesis (“The two samples have the
same underlying distribution function.”) is rejected.
For the Chi-Square Test, we use a custom implementation. Similar to the
Kolmogorow-Smirnow Test, it is applied to the inter-message time intervals.
As the test expects the two samples to be categorized into bins, we need to
do this before calculating the actual test statistic. Literature suggests to choose
bin sizes so that no bin contains less than 5 elements for any sample [7]. Thus,
we adaptively choose bins of varying size. The lower bound for the first bin is
the lowest value in any of the two input samples. The upper bound for a bin
(which is also the lower bound for the next bin) is chosen as the smallest number
which results in at least 5 elements of each sample falling into this bin. We thus
guarantee that at least 5 values are in each bin for each sample. An example for
the binning approach is depicted in Fig. 1. For the Chi-Square Test we calculate
and examine the test statistic.
4.3 Message Counts Test (MC Test)
Our “Message Counts Test” divides the number of messages in the larger sample
by the number of messages in the smaller one and subtracts 1, resulting in a
value within [0,+∞[. Higher values indicate larger differences in the amounts of
messages, just as higher results in the other tests indicate different distributions.
The idea behind it is that if the sheer amount of activity in the system is very
different to that during the reference time frame, the user state is likely to be
different. For example, if the reference capture was taken while Alice is present
and the capture in question shows lower activity, Alice is likely to be absent.
Formally, given two samples X = [x1, x2, . . . , xn] and Y = [y1, y2, . . . , ym],
the test statistic is defined as
Similar to the Chi-Square test, we calculate and examine the test statistic.
C =
max(n,m)
min(n,m)
− 1 (5)
5 Analysis Procedure
We obtained input data for our analysis by collecting packet captures from two
real-world home automation systems. System 1 is an installation using Home-
Matic hardware, an off-the-shelf solution for consumers, which was already used
as a base for our previous work on this topic [17]. The owner voluntarily cap-
tured all traffic for 36 days and provided us with the log files as well as presence
and absence times. System 2 is data from a custom system, built by combining
multiple automation products from different manufacturers. Traffic was recorded
for 37 days and published in a series of news articles4.
As a first step, we annotate each message with the user state: Present
and Absent are chosen based on the available data. A third state, Asleep is
introduced to handle the fact that during night hours (22:00 to 08:00), users are
usually asleep and thus the activity of the system is reduced. Due to the vague
nature of the Asleep state and the fact that we cannot be sure whether the
users were actually asleep during this time, we exclude it from further analysis
and only investigate messages whose state is either Present or Absent.
Analysing each system by itself, we construct (non-overlapping) intervals of
1 hour each during which the user state did not change. For each interval, we
gather the messages sent during this time into Message Groups. Each Message
Group is thus identifiable by its system and the timestamp of the first message.
Also, as per the construction of intervals described above, each group has a fixed
user state. For System 1, we obtain 180 Message Groups with state Present,
136 Message Groups with state Absent and 237 Message Groups with state
Asleep. For System 2, the numbers are 223, 125 and 296, respectively.
For all non-identical combinations of Message Groups (only considering those
with states Present and Absent)—167, 941 in total—we perform the 3 statis-
tical tests mentioned in Sec. 4. We then visualize the results in boxplots, both
overall per system as well as individually for each combination of user states.
In a second step, we test different thresholds for all tests and plot the true and
false positive rates in ROC diagrams.
4 http://spon.de/aeDkn, accessed 2015-12-18.
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Fig. 2. General Test Results for both systems. The boxes extend from the first to the
third quartile. The whiskers extend up to 1.5× IQR past the boxes, where IQR is the
interquartile range. If IQR = 0 (as with the χ2 Test for different states in System 2),
the whiskers extend up to the minimum and maximum values. Red lines mark the
medians while red squares mark the arithmetic means. Blue plus signs show outliers
beyond the whiskers.
6 Analysis Results
6.1 Test Suitability in the General Case
At first, we plot all test results by system and test and only distinguish between
the two cases whether or not the samples have different user states. This sec-
tion gives a general and quick overview over the suitability of the tests for our
purposes. If the plots of the two cases differ significantly, the test results carry
a high amount of information and if they are largely the same, the information
immediately available from the test result is limited. The plots are visualised
in Fig. 2 for both systems. The boxplots do not show any immediately obvious
peculiarities. For both systems and all tests, the boxes overlap and thus suggest
that the tests cannot be used as a universal oracle telling Eve whether the 2
compared samples have been taken with the same user state.
System 1. For System 1, the χ2 Test values are broadly spread. Comparing
samples with the same user state yields values from 0 to 53.5, samples from
different states lead to values from 0 to 57.2. This suggests that there may be an
upper bound to the value for samples of the same state and that values above
this limit indicate a different state of the two compared samples.
The KS Test statistic D ranges from 0.04 to 0.66 for the same state and from
0.04 to 0.72 for different states. Like the Chi-Square test, this suggests an upper
bound for the value in the same-state case.
The KS p-values again provide similar information. For the same state, the
values range from 6.41× 10−12 to 1− 10−11, for different states they range from
4.76×10−15 to 1−10−12. The null hypothesis (“The two samples originate from
the same distribution [=the same state].”) is rejected for p-values lower than a
threshold. The lower minimum value for different results shows that the default
thresholds are not useful in our scenario.
The MC Test provides the least useful results. The values are in fact mis-
leading: While they range from 0 to 20.6 for samples with the same state and the
minimum is the same for different states, the maximum value in the latter case
is only 14.4. This shows that while the user state does not change, the number
of messages being generated in a given time frame can differ significantly.
System 2. The results for System 2 offer much less information than those
for System 1. The χ2 Test values range from 0 to 82.8 for samples with the
same state and from 0 to 45.8 for samples with different states. As shown in
Fig. 2, 75% (the lower three quartiles) of the tests with different states had the
result 0. These values are misleading if interpreted in the same way as those of
System 1. Intuitively, the values should be higher for different states (and they
are for System 1). We conclude that either the test’s usefulness depends on the
type of the HAS or that the previous results were not representative.
The KS Test statistic D yields values in the full range [0, 1] for samples with
the same state. While this already indicates that the test is not useful for this
system, the same range of values for samples with different states support this.
Consequently, the KS Test p-values are inconclusive as well: They range from
1.13×10−16 to 1 for the same state and from 2.28×10−8 to 1 for different states.
The MC Test surprisingly yields the exact same range of values for both
cases: The results range from 0 to 235 in both cases.
6.2 Test Suitability Per State Pair
In the next step we take a closer look at the different combinations of user states.
Our hypothesis is that the tests may give useful results for certain combinations
of states and less useful results for others. This section deals with the perfor-
mance of the tests for a given pair of user states. Fig. 3 summarizes the results
for both systems.
System 1. Results of the χ2 Test for System 1 do not yield much more infor-
mation than what we could already see from the general evaluation. The two
cases in which the user states are the same largely overlap and the ranges of
values are almost the same. The same holds for both statistics of the KS Test.
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Fig. 3. Per state pair test results for both systems. The plot parameters are the same
as for Fig. 2. The reason why the combination Present-Absent does not appear is
the symmetry of all tests: T (a, b) = T (b, a).
The MC Test provides some new results: If both samples have the state Ab-
sent, the values do not go above 0.71. This means that if Eve obtains a sample
known to have the state Absent, and gets higher value when comparing it to
a second (unknown) sample, she can be sure that Alice was present during the
time frame of the second sample. However, this is only the case for 2.4% of the
tested Absent-Present sample pairs.
System 2. In contrast to System 1, the boxplot of the χ2 Test for System 2
exhibits obvious differences between the state pairs. If one of the samples has
the state Absent, 75% of the tests evaluate to 0. Similarly to the MC Test for
System 1, the plots show that there is a threshold above which Eve can be sure
that Alice is Present if her first (known) sample has the state Absent. This
threshold is at 8.45 and 2.12% of the Absent-Present pairs reach a higher
value. However, also similar to System 1, Eve cannot make such a confident
decision if her known sample has state Present.
The KS Test does not show such features; this is consistent with System 1.
The MC Test confirms the observation from the χ2 Test and yields another
threshold. The threshold value is 81 and 1.77% (494 out of 27, 875) of the tests
with different states result in higher values. Surprisingly, though, none of these
494 Message Group pairs gave a result above the threshold for the χ2 Test. In
fact, some pairs even evaluated to 0 in the χ2 Test. This is highly interesting,
as it suggests that a combination of different tests with the same input data can
provide significantly more information than one test alone. Using the thresholds
of both tests, Eve can identify 3.89% or 1084 of 27, 875 Message Group pairs as
having different states if one of the samples is known to have the state Absent.
6.3 The Effect of Different Thresholds on Classification Rates
As shown in the previous section, some tests exhibit maximum values for certain
state combinations, and knowing such values may enable Eve to infer Alice’s user
state at a given time with absolute confidence. Below these, however, statements
about presence and absence are more difficult to make. In this section we examine
the effect of different chosen threshold values on the classification rates.
We compute True and False Positive Rates TPR and FPR for all possible
threshold levels using the data from the tests previously conducted. In our case,
the rates are defined as follows:
If s(a) is the state of a sample a, T (a, b) is the test result of the pair (a, b), t
is the threshold value below which sample pairs are classified as having the same
state and Na,b(cond) is the number of sample pairs a, b which satisfy a condition
cond, then
TPR =
Na,b(s(a) = s(b) ∧ T (a, b) < t)
Na,b(s(a) = s(b))
(6)
FPR =
Na,b(s(a) 6= s(b) ∧ T (a, b) < t)
Na,b(s(a) 6= s(b)) (7)
TPR is the number of correctly classified same-state pairs divided by the
total number of same-state pairs and FPR is the number of different-state-pairs
which were incorrectly classified as having the same state divided by the total
number of different-state pairs. TPR is a measure for how well the test can
identify samples with the same state as the source and FPR is a measure for
how often the test falsely reports two samples for having the same state.
In order to visualise the rates, we plot ROC (Receiver Operating Character-
istics) curves and calculate the AUC (Area Under Curve) for all of them. ROC
curves illustrate how fast the test performance drops (i.e. how fast the False
Positive Rate increases) when raising the threshold to get a higher True Positive
Rate. The AUC is a numerical measure for this quality: In the ideal case (the
test has a TPR of 1.0 and a FPR of 0.0) the value is 1 and in the worst case (the
test does not perform better than randomly guessing), the value is 0.5. Values
below 0.5 are similar to values above, since the test result interpretation can be
inverted to invert the ROC curve (i.e. values above the threshold are interpreted
as indicators for a same-state pair).
A selection of ROC curves is depicted in Fig. 4. Some tests (most notably the
χ2 Test for System 2) yield high values for both rates with the lowest possible
threshold, which is why the curves do not start at the origin [0, 0]. To calcu-
late the AUC for these cases, we use the line of no-discrimination—the values
obtained by randomly guessing—up to the FPR of the lowest threshold (the X
coordinate). From there on, we proceed with the regular estimation and calculate
the area below the straight line between two subsequent data points.
Most curves do not exhibit large deviations from the mean line. For System 1,
both the χ2 Test and the two KS Tests yield an AUC between 0.52 and 0.57.
Only the MC Test performs slightly better, the AUC is 0.525 for a source sample
with state Present and 0.688 for an Absent source sample (shown in Fig. 4).
Overall, the results for System 1 suggest that statistical tests are only of
limited use in deducing user states from inter-message intervals.
System 2 mostly confirms this observation, although the performance of the
different tests varies drastically.
The χ2 Test performs badly: For a Present source sample, the minimum
obtainable False Positive rate is 91.6% at a True Positive Rate of 61.3% (the
threshold value in this case is 0). For an Absent source sample, the minimum
False Positive rate is consequently the same, but the minimum True Positive
rate is 98.0%. The KS Test and the MC Test perform much better. Their AUC
values are relatively high and significant True Positive rates can be obtained
while keeping the False Positive rates below 50%.
From the analysis of the ROC curves we draw two conclusions. Firstly some
tests exhibit a significant deviation from the line of no-discrimination. Combining
multiple tests could further improve the results and yield more information.
Secondly we can confirm our previous observation that extreme threshold values
lead to absolute certainty in the classification.
6.4 Feasibility of Detection in Practice
The statistical tests do not yield clear results in all cases we examined. However,
upper or lower bounds can be determined in some cases, which then allow Eve to
make statements with absolute confidence. The requirements for these thresholds
to be useful for Eve are not hard to meet: She needs a source sample which—
when tested in conjunction with samples of a different state—yields values above
or below the thresholds.
To verify the practicability of this attack we divide our traffic data into a
training set and a test set. For training, we use the first 70% of our data (221
Message Groups from System 1, 244 Message Groups from System 2).
We perform all aforementioned tests on the training data and calculate
thresholds for Message Group pairs with the same state. Using these thresh-
old, we choose one Message Group for every system and state where the amount
of correct classifications among the training data is maximized—i.e. the Group
with the highest TPR among the training data. We then check each of these
Groups against the test data and calculate True and False Positive Rates using
the thresholds calculated from the training data before.
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Fig. 4. ROC curves for different tests and source states. Blue points show the ac-
tual values, dotted red lines of no-discrimination show linear ascension from [0, 0]
to [1, 1]—the values obtained by randomly guessing. The graphics indicate that the
test performance strongly depends on the system and the source sample. As noted in
Sec. 6.1, the χ2 Test for System 2 produces counterintuitive results.
For System 1 using an Absent source sample, we reach a TPR of 5.3% and
a FPR of 1.1%. This suggests that the attack is not useful in practice. Using a
Present source sample, however, the FPR is at 0 while the TPR reaches 1%.
It is thus only a matter of time until Eve can successfully identify an Absent
sample if she has a suitable Present source sample. For System 2, the best
Absent source sample achieves a TPR of 5.8% while the FPR also stays at 0.
However, in the data for this System no suitable Present source sample exists.
The tests do not yield thresholds which allow for an unanimous classification.
This particular attack is not likely to be encountered in reality: Eve would
have to manually observe Alice’s home for several hours or even days, annotating
the captured traffic with the user states for every one-hour sample. However, the
experiment shows that under the right circumstances, unanimous classification is
possible. The experiment supports the theory that system-wide thresholds exist
which allow for a classification of states with absolute certainty. The follow-up
question whether such thresholds exist for a manufacturer or production series
remains to be answered.
7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we have performed the first analysis of inter-message intervals in
Home Automation using statistical goodness of fit tests. We have used sample
data from two real world installations to measure the ability of an attacker in
deducing user states. In particular, we tried to answer the question:
If Eve has captured 1 hour of traffic from the Alice’s HAS and knows whether
Alice was present at that time, can Eve deduce Alice’s state by capturing another
hour of traffic?
Comparing and combining various tests, we were able to identify conditions
under which the question above could be confidently answered with yes.
The χ2 Test provides little information with regard to the question. However,
the MC Test and, in some cases, the KS Test reveal identifiable discrepancies
between samples with different states. A combination of all three tests allow an
attacker to mount a practical attack on the system and infer the user state by
passively listening after obtaining a suitable source sample.
For future work, we will work on new tests and combine them with those
applied in this paper in order to obtain more information. At the same time,
we will study the different properties of HASs to find out if there are filtering
techniques which can be applied to the samples in order to make the tests more
effective. Since this increases the abilities of an attacker to predict user presence
and absence without physical labour, we will also develop dummy traffic schemes
for use in HASs. These offer users the ability to mask their traffic and hide their
state from unauthorized observers.
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